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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a Bayesian framework for solving a class of problems termed
Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning (MIRL). Compared to the well-known Inverse
Reinforcement Learning (IRL) problem, MIRL is formalized in the context of a stochastic
game rather than a Markov decision process (MDP). Games bring two primary challenges:
First, the concept of optimality, central to MDPs, loses its meaning and must be replaced
with a more general solution concept, such as the Nash equilibrium. Second, the non-
uniqueness of equilibria means that in MIRL, in addition to multiple reasonable solutions for
a given inversion model, there may be multiple inversion models that are all equally sensible
approaches to solving the problem. We establish a theoretical foundation for competitive
two-agent MIRL problems and propose a Bayesian optimization algorithm to solve the
problem. We focus on the case of two-person zero-sum stochastic games, developing a
generative model for the likelihood of unknown rewards of agents given observed game play
assuming that the two agents follow a minimax bipolicy. As a numerical illustration, we
apply our method in the context of an abstract soccer game. For the soccer game, we
investigate relationships between the extent of prior information and the quality of learned
rewards. Results suggest that covariance structure is more important than mean value in
reward priors.
1. Introduction
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) problem, as characterized in (Russell, 1998), aims
to optimally recover reward functions, given the measurements of an agent’s behavior over
time, as well as a model of the environment. IRL has been the subject of extensive studies
and has been applied to a number of problems, most related to the problem of learning
from demonstrations. Apprenticeship learning algorithms based on IRL, which leverage
expert demonstrations to efficiently learn good controllers for tasks being demonstrated by
an expert, have been applied to automatic control of helicopter flight (Abbeel & Ng, 2004)
and modeling of driver route preferences (Ziebart, Maas, Bagnell, & Dey, 2008). In the
field of computer graphics, IRL also has been used to learn behavior styles for the motion
controller of an animation system (Lee & Popovic, 2010). In (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum,
2009), IRL was viewed from the perspective of human decision making as a method for
modeling human action understanding, and the results of psychophysical experiments using
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animated stimuli of agents moving in simple masses provide quantitative evidence that the
inverse planning models can predict human goal inferences.
Although a variety of approaches (Ng & Russell, 2000; Qiao & Beling, 2011; Levine,
Popovic´, & Koltun, 2011; Krishnamurthy & Todorov, 2010; Ramachandran & Amir, 2007)
have been proposed for solving the IRL problem, almost all of them are based on the as-
sumption that no other adaptive agents exist in the environment. Attempting to jointly
consider the decision making processes of interacting rational agents can significantly com-
plicate models, but leads to more insightful models of multi-agent systems. This is the
motivation for Littman to propose the Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MRL) prob-
lem (Littman, 1994). Conceptually, RL is a simplified or approximate version of MRL in
the sense that the former treats other agents in the system as part of the environment,
ignoring the difference between responsive agents and passive environment. Littman makes
use of a Markov or stochastic game (Owen, 1968), which involves game theory, to deal with
the multi-agent learning problem. However, only the special case of two-player zero-sum
games, in which one agent’s gain is always the other’s loss, is considered. Hu and Wellman
(Hu & Wellman, 1998) extend Littman’s work, proposing a two-player general-sum stochas-
tic game framework for the MRL problem. They point out that the concept of optimality
loses its meaning in MRL problems since any agent’s payoff depends on others’ choices of
actions, and as a result adopt as a solution concept the Nash equilibrium, in which each
agent’s choice is the best response to other agents’ choices.
Later MRL work has focused on the development of solution concepts and methods. For
example, in (Abdallah & Lesser, 2008) a weak condition where an agent can neither observe
other agents’ actions or rewards, nor knows the underlying game or the corresponding Nash
equilibrium a priori is considered and a new MRL algorithm called the Weighted Policy
Learner (WPL) is proposed. Multi-agent learning in complex large distributed systems
is also touched in (Kash, Friedman, & Halpern, 2011), where it is noted that, although
sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms generally do not scale, it is possible to find
restricted classes of games where simple efficient algorithms converge. Solution concepts
for distributed, multi-agent planning problems that involve coordination games under weak
information exchange models have been considered in (Patek, Beling, & Zhao, 2007; Zhao,
Patek, & Beling, 2008).
Inverse learning problems for MRL, which we term MIRL, include the problem of esti-
mating the game payoffs being played, given observations of the actions taken by the players,
as well as the state transitions. Compared to the well-known IRL problem, MIRL is more
challenging in that it is formalized in the context of a stochastic game rather than a MDP.
Games bring two primary challenges. First, as Hu and Wellman (Hu & Wellman, 1998)
note, the concept of optimality, central to MDPs, must be replaced with an equilibrium
solution concept, such as the Nash equilibrium. Second, the non-uniqueness of equilibria
means that in MIRL, in addition to multiple reasonable solutions for a given inversion
model, there may be multiple inversion models that are all equally sensible approaches to
solving the problem.
Several recent papers have studied problems that may appear quite similar to the MIRL
problem discussed here. For example, Natarajan et al. (Natarajan, Kunapuli, Judah,
Tadepalli, Kersting, & Shavlik, 2010) presents an inverse reinforcement learning model for
multiple agents. However, that paper does not consider competing agents or game-theoretic
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models, a key characteristic of our work. A recent paper (Waugh, Ziebart, & Bagnell, 2011)
does consider a form of the inverse equilibrium problem. However, that paper considers
simultaneous one-stage games, rather than the sequential stochastic games we consider
here. Gopikrishna et al. (?) solves a non-cooperative multiagent system using IRL in
a decentralized fashion. Their framework works for the case that one active player who
has perfect information about her own reward but wants to infer others’. It is completely
different from our perspective of MIRL in which the third-party observer is not involved in
the multi-agent system. A two-person zero-sum formulation of the MIRL problem and a
Bayesian framework for its solution was first given in (Beling, Cogill, & Lin., 2013).
This paper explores the theory developed in (Beling et al., 2013) in more details and
reports on a broader and deeper set of numerical experiments and simulations, which in
turn, helps to re-examine the theory from the perspective of application. In our work,
the Bayesian framework is well-defined for any prior. We prefer a Gaussian prior because
the framework will yield a tractable, convex optimization problem for computing point
estimates of rewards.
We apply for a broad range of basic dynamics within the numerical example, we in-
vestigate relationships between the extent of prior information and the quality of learned
rewards. The quality of learned rewards is measured by distance metrics in reward and
probability space and by the game playing success of agents that use the rewards as the
basis for an equilibrium policy. The weakest priors result in learned rewards that would
give an agent using them no chance of winning the game, while the strongest priors result
in learned rewards essentially as good as ground truth. Additionally, results suggest that
covariance structure is more important than mean value in reward priors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces notation,
terminology, definitions, and some basic properties needed for later work. Section 3 provides
the main technical results, including a Bayesian framework for MIRL and formulation of a
convex optimization problem for learning rewards. Section 4 introduces the soccer model
and includes basic results on the quality of learned rewards. Section 5 provides evaluation of
learned rewards in terms of game playing success in simulations of the soccer game. Section
6 offers concluding remarks and a discussion of future work.
2. Stochastic Games
A two-player discounted stochastic game is played as follows. The game begins in one of
finitely many states. There is a reward for each player. In each state, each player simul-
taneously selects one of finitely many actions, and hence receives a reward that associates
with current state and sometimes, as well as the actions selected by one or both players.
The game then makes a stochastic transition to a new state, where the transition is depen-
dent on the starting state and the jointly selected actions. This process is repeated over an
infinite time horizon, where geometrically discounted rewards are accrued additively.
Under these rules, we can specify an instance of a two-person zero-sum stochastic game
in terms of the state space S = {1, 2, · · · , N}, the action spaces A1 = A2 = {1, 2, · · · ,M},
a reward vector rk for each player k ∈ {1, 2}, transition probabilities p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
, and a
discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1).
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A solution to a stochastic game is a bipolicy, which provides the rules that each player
follows when selecting actions at each state. Without loss of generality, a bipolicy can be
specified by a collection of conditional probability mass functions pi1 and pi2, where player
k selects action ak in state s with probability pik(ak|s). Each pik(·|s) is referred to as the
strategy played by player k in state s.
Given that each player can select from amongM actions, the strategy followed by player
k in state s can be represented by the M × 1 vector pik (s). The bistrategy for state s is the
set of two column vectors that denote the strategies employed by player 1 and player 2 in
state s,
pi (s) =
{
pi1 (s) , pi2 (s)
}
.
In this notation, the bipolicy is defined as the set of all bistrategies over all states,
pi = {pi (1) , pi (1) , · · · , pi (N)} .
2.1 Zero-sum Case
Atwo-player zero-sum discounted stochastic game is a special case of the game defined above,
in which under the same state s and action pairs
(
a1, a2
)
, r1
(
s, a1, a2
)
= −r2
(
s, a1, a2
)
.
Due to the symmetry in rewards between the two players, we will often simply use r to
denote r1. In the remainder of this paper restrict attention to the zero-sum case.
We use r˜pi (s) to denote the single-stage expected reward of agent 1 under state s under
bipolicy pi, and r˜pi as a column vector with ith component r˜pi (s). r˜pi (s) is defined as
r˜pi (s) =
∑
a1,a2
pi1
(
a1|s
)
pi2
(
a2|s
)
r
(
s, a1, a2
)
=
[
pi1 (s)
]T
r (s)pi2 (s) , (1)
where r (s) is a M ×M matrix, whose entries are independent of pi (s). We can express this
relationship in matrix notation as
r˜pi = Bpir, (2)
where Bpi is a N ×NM
2 matrix constructed from bipolicy pi, whose kth row is:[
Φpi1,1 (k) ,Φ
pi
1,2 (k) , · · · ,Φ
pi
M,M (k)
]
,
where
Φpii,j (k) = 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, φpii,j (k) , 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−k
,
and
φpii,j (k) = pi
1 (i|k) pi2 (j|k) .
The bipolicy-dependent, discounted expected sum of rewards of player 1 as a function
of the initial state, which is known as the value function, can be formulated as:
Vpi (s) =
∞∑
t=0
γtE
(
r˜tpi (st) |s0 = s
)
, (3)
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where st denotes the state of the game at stage t and r˜
t
pi denotes player 1’s expected reward
under bipolicy pi at that stage. Note that the superscript t can be removed because of the
Markov property. Vpi denotes the column vector with ith component Vpi (i).
In addition, we define player 1’s Q-function of state s and action pair
(
a1, a2
)
, under
bipolicy pi, as
Qpi
(
s, a1, a2
)
= r
(
s, a1, a2
)
+ γ
∑
s′
p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
Vpi
(
s′
)
. (4)
Over all states and actions, we can write equation (4) in matrix notation as
Qpi = r + γPVpi, (5)
where P is a NM2 ×N matrix with p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
as its elements.
Let Gpi denote transition matrix under bipolicy pi. Specifically, Gpi is the N ×N matrix
with elements
gpi
(
s′|s
)
=
∑
a1,a2
pi1
(
a1|s
)
pi2
(
a2|s
)
p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
. (6)
Note that
Vpi (s) = r˜pi (s) + γ
{
∞∑
t=1
γt−1E
(
rtpi (st) |s0 = s
)}
= r˜pi (s) + γ
∑
s′
gpi
(
s′|s
)
Vpi
(
s′
)
.
(7)
This equation can be written in matrix notation as
Vpi = r˜pi + γGpiVpi. (8)
Thus
Vpi = (I − γGpi)
−1Bpir, (9)
where (I − γGpi) is always invertible for γ ∈ [0, 1) since Gpi is a transition matrix. The
value function Vpi (s) can be expressed in terms of the Q-function as
Vpi (s) =
[
pi1 (s)
]T
Qpi (s)pi
2 (s) . (10)
where Qpi (s) is a M ×M matrix for agent 1, whose (i, j) element is given by Qpi (s, i, j).
Note that while Qpi (s) is a matrix, the Qpi introduced in (5) is an NM
2× 1 vector. We will
use this relationship between the Q-function and the value function to define a minimax
bipolicy for a stochastic game.
We will assume that rational agents playing a two-player zero-sum stochastic game seek
a minimax bipolicy. A minimax bipolicy is an equilibrium, in that it has the property
that neither player can change the game value in their favor given that the other player
holds their policy fixed. To give a precise definition of a minimax bipolicy, we will start by
reviewing the notion of a minimax bistrategy for a static game (Neumann & Morgenstern,
1944).
First consider a static (single-stage) zero-sum game, where two players simultaneously
choose an action and both players receive a reward determined by the joint choice of actions.
The minimax theorem states that for every two-person zero-sum game with finitely many
actions, there exists a value V and a mixed strategy for each player such that
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• Given player 2’s strategy, the best expected reward possible for player 1 is V .
• Given player 1’s strategy, the best expected reward possible for player 2 is −V .
As before, the strategies played by both players in a certain state s can be expressed in
terms of probability mass functions pi1 and pi2. Expressing the reward received by player 1
as an M ×M matrix Q, the value of the game for player 1 under a minimax bistrategy is
given by
value (Q) = max
pi1
{
min
pi2
{[
pi1
]T
Qpi2
}}
.
A pair pi1 and pi2 that achieves this value is called a minimax bistrategy. For zero-sum
games, a minimax bistrategy is also a Nash equilibrium.
The concept of a minimax bistrategy can be extended to two-player discounted stochastic
games via the following theorem (Shapley, 1953).
Theorem 2.1 (Shapley’s Theorem). There exists a bipolicy pi such that
Vpi (s) = value (Qpi (s)) (11)
for all s ∈ S.
A bipolicy that satisfies Theorem 2.1 is called a minimax bipolicy. For a minimax
bipolicy, Vpi (s) gives the game value from each initial state s ∈ S. In the remainder of
this paper, we will assume that agents are observed playing a game according to a minimax
bipolicy, and the known properties of their bipolicy will be used to infer the reward structure
of the game.
3. Bayesian MIRL
We will formulate two-agent MIRL problems in a Bayesian optimization setting. Bayesian
methods have been widely adopted for IRL problems (Baker et al., 2009; Choi & Kim, 2011;
Dimitrakakis & Rothkopf, 2011; Engel, Mannor, & Meir, 2005; Michini & How, 2012; Qiao
& Beling, 2011; Ramachandran & Amir, 2007). In a Bayesian setting, we assign a prior
distribution to the reward functions. This prior distribution encodes the learners initial
belief about the reward functions before any observations are made. For our problem, we
assume that the complete bipolicy for the agents is observable. Given an observed bipolicy,
we can generate a point estimate of the reward function from the posterior distribution over
reward functions. To construct this point estimate, we must know the likelihood of observing
each bipolicy for each given reward function. So, our efforts are focused on determining the
appropriate likelihood function for the MIRL problem, and the development of optimization
models that can be used to generate point estimates of the reward function.
We will now formally develop the Bayesian model for the MIRL problem. Let f (r)
denote the prior distribution on the reward of agent 1 (recalling that we denote r = r1 and
r1 = −r2 for zero-sum games). We will discuss the selection of prior distributions further
in Section 3.1. Also, let p (pi|r) denote the likelihood of observing bipolicy pi when the
true reward is r. Hence now our objective is to maximize f (r|pi), the posterior of rewards
given an observing bipolicy. To model the likelihood p, we make the following assumptions
regarding the agents selection of a bipolicy:
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1. The two agents select a minimax bipolicy with respect to the reward function r.
2. If the minimax bipolicy for a given r is not unique, then one is selected uniformly at
random from among all minimax bipolicies.
If the minimax bipolicy is unique for a given r, the likelihood is a probability mass
function given by
p (pi|r) =
{
1, if pi is the unique minimax bipolicy for r
0, otherwise.
(12)
If the minimax bipolicy is not unique, then there are a countable number of minimax
bipolicies. In this case, the likelihood is a uniform distribution given by
p (pi|r) =
{
1
K(r) , if pi is a minimax bipolicy for r
0, otherwise,
where K (r) is a normalizing constant.
The posterior distribution of rewards for a given observed bipolicy is now
f (r|pi) ∝ p (pi|r) f (r) .
So
f (r|pi) ∝
{
f(r)
K(r) , if pi is a minimax bipolicy for r
0, otherwise,
where we will use K (r) = 1 for the case where the minimax bipolicy is unique.
A maximum a-posteriori (MAP) estimate of r can be generated by selecting a vector r
that maximizes f (r|pi), or equivalently maximizes p (pi|r) f (r). The next sections provide
the details of an optimization formulation of the MAP estimation approach to MIRL.
3.1 Prior Distributions on Rewards
In our Bayesian MIRL framework, we use prior distributions over reward functions to model
our initial uncertainty in the reward. Although any prior may be used, in this paper we
focus on Gaussian priors for rewards. Gaussians are a reasonable choice of prior since they
provide a straightforward model for representing uncertainty around a nominal choice of
reward function, and have the added benefit of leading to analytically tractable inference
procedures.
Specifically, we model r ∼ N (µr,Σr), where µr is the mean of r and Σr is the covariance
matrix. The probability density function of r is
f (r) =
1
(2pi)N/2 |Σr|
1/2
exp
(
−
1
2
(r − µr)
T Σ−1r (r − µr)
)
. (13)
3.2 Characterization of the Likelihood Function
Recall that the likelihood p (pi|r) is nonzero if and only if pi is a minimax bipolicy with
respect to the reward function r. In this paper, we will assume that there is a unique
minimax bipolicy for all reward functions of interest. When this is the case, p (pi|r) = 1
when pi is the unique minimax bipolicy for the reward function r and p (pi|r) = 0 otherwise.
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3.3 The Optimization Model
In this section, we will present the details of an optimization formulation of the problem
of computing a MAP estimate of r given a bipolicy pi. Computing a MAP-optimal reward
function reduces to computing an r that maximizes p (pi|r) f (r), where f (r) is a prior
distribution over rewards. So, in the case where the given minimax bipolicy is unique with
respect to the desired reward, a MAP-optimal reward can be computed by solving the
optimization problem
maximize: f (r)
subject to: p (pi|r) = 1
(14)
The remainder of this section will be devoted to developing a tractable characterization of
the set of feasible r. Consider, as a first step, the class of static, single-stage, zero-sum
games. In these games, minimax strategies satisfy the conditions of the following theorem
(Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Ferguson, 2008):
Theorem 3.1 (Minimax Theorem). Consider a two-person zero-sum game with M ×M
payoff matrix A. There exists a value V , a mixed strategy p for player 1, and a mixed
strategy q for player 2 such that
AT p ≥ V 1M
Aq ≤ V 1M
(15)
Moreover, p and q are an equilibrium bistrategy and V is the game value if and only if (15)
holds.
This theorem has direct implications for inverse learning problems. Consider a static
game as a special case of the MIRL problem, where the goal is to recover a A such that
the given bistrategy (p, q) is a minimax bistrategy. Hence, the linear constraints (15) give
a characterization of the desired constraint set for a two-person zero-sum static game.
We will now extend this approach to a multi-stage stochastic game. Combining Theorem
2.1 with Theorem 3.1, a bipolicy pi is a minimax bipolicy if and only if
[Qpi (s)]
T pi1 (s) ≥ Vpi (s) 1M
Qpi (s)pi
2 (s) ≤ Vpi (s) 1M
(16)
for all s ∈ S. The linear inequalities (16) provide conditions that must hold for the Q-
function and value function of a stochastic game if pi is a minimax bipolicy.
Since our ultimate goal is to estimate the reward function of a stochastic game, we must
introduce additional constraints relating the Q-function and value function to rewards.
From (5) and (9), recall that
Qpi = r + γPVpi
Vpi = (I − γGpi)
−1Bpir
(17)
The following proposition makes use of the linear inequalities (16) and equalities (17)
to provide a precise relationship between the given bipolicy pi and the rewards r if pi is a
minimax bipolicy.
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Proposition 3.2. In a two-person zero-sum stochastic game, pi is a minimax bipolicy if
and only if player 1’s reward vector r satisfies(
Bpi2|a1=i −Bpi
)
Dpir ≤ 0(
Bpi1|a2=j −Bpi
)
Dpir ≥ 0
, (18)
for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2, where Bpi is defined in (2). Bpi1|a2=j and Dpi are defined in (20)
and (22), respectively.
Proof. From (1), (2) and (10), we can deduce that
Vpi = BpiQpi. (19)
Let Bpi1|a2=j denote the Bpi obtained when pi
1 is used as player 1’s policy, and player 2
selects action a2 = j in all states. In this notation, the inequalities (15) can be expressed as
Bpi1|a2=jQpi ≥ BpiQpi,∀j ∈ A2
Bpi1|a1=iQpi ≤ BpiQpi,∀i ∈ A1
. (20)
Substituting the expression for Vpi into the expression for Qpi in (17), we obtain
Qpi = r + γP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpir =
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpi
)
r. (21)
Finally, letting
Dpi =
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1Bpi
)
, (22)
the inequalities (20) can be expressed as(
Bpi1|a2=j −Bpi
)
Dpir ≥ 0,∀j ∈ A
2(
Bpi2|a1=i −Bpi
)
Dpir ≤ 0,∀i ∈ A
1
(23)
We now formulate a convex quadratic program equivalent to (14). Recall that we use a
Gaussian prior in this paper, so the objective function in (14) is log-concave. To obtain an
equivalent convex optimization problem, we will instead minimize − ln (f (r)). Combining
(18) with the negative log-prior objective, the optimization problem (14) can be solved as
the equivalent convex quadratic program
minimize:
1
2
(r − µr)
T Σr
−1 (r − µr)
subject to:
(
Bpi2|a1=i −Bpi
)
Dpir ≤ 0(
Bpi2|a1=j −Bpi
)
Dpir ≥ 0
(24)
for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2.
The optimization problem (24) is specific to two-person zero-sum MIRL problems, which
is a class of problems in which the reward value does depend on actions. The following
proposition provides a variant of Proposition 3.2 that applies when reward does not depend
on actions.
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Proposition 3.3. In a two-person zero-sum stochastic game, assume that the reward is
only state-dependent, then pi is a minimax bipolicy if and only if player 1’s reward vector r
satisfies (
Gpi −Gpi2|a1=i
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 r ≥ 0(
Gpi −Gpi1|a2=j
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 r ≤ 0
(25)
for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2, where Gpi and Gpi2|a1=i are defined in (6) and (31), respectively.
Proof. Recall that
[Qpi (s)]
T pi1 (s) ≥ Vpi (s) 1M
Qpi (s)pi
2 (s) ≤ Vpi (s) 1M
, (26)
where
Qpi
(
s, a1, a2
)
= r(s) + γ
∑
s′
p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
Vpi
(
s′
)
(27)
Vpi = r + γGpiVpi. (28)
Note that the Q-function (27) and the value function (28) are expressions for the case when
rewards are independent of actions. Because of symmetry, we only consider the second
inequality of (26), which can be expended as

Qpi (s, 1, 1) , · · · , Qpi (s, 1,M)
Qpi (s, 2, 1) , · · · , Qpi (s, 2,M)
...
...
...
Qpi (s,M, 1) , · · · , Qpi (s,M,M)




pi2 (s, 1)
pi2 (s, 2)
...
pi2 (s,M)

 ≤ Vpi (s) 1M (29)
Substituting (27) into (29) we obtain
r (s) 1M + γ


∑
s′,a2 p
(
s′|s, 1, a2
)
pi2
(
a2|s
)
Vpi (s
′)∑
s′,a2 p
(
s′|s, 2, a2
)
pi2
(
a2|s
)
Vpi (s
′)
...∑
s′,a2 p
(
s′|s,M, a2
)
pi2
(
a2|s
)
Vpi (s
′)

 ≤ Vpi (s) 1M . (30)
Let
Gpi2|a1=i
(
s, s′
)
= gpi2|a1=i
(
s′|s
)
=
∑
a2
pi2
(
a2|s
)
p
(
s′|s, i, a2
)
, (31)
Gpi2|a1=i can be regarded as a stochastic state transition matrix under the condition that
player 1 complies with a fixed policy that she always takes action i in any state while the
other agent sticks to her original policy pi2. (30) then can be simplified as
r (s) 1M + γ


∑
s′ gpi2|a1=1 (s
′|s)Vpi (s
′)∑
s′ gpi2|a1=2 (s
′|s)Vpi (s
′)
...∑
s′ gpi2|a1=M (s
′|s)Vpi (s
′)

 ≤ Vpi (s) 1M , (32)
which can be rewritten as
r (s) +
∑
s′
gpi2|a1=i
(
s′|s
)
Vpi
(
s′
)
≤ Vpi (s) ,∀i ∈ A
1. (33)
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We can express the above inequality in matrix notation, as
r + γGpi2|a1=iVpi ≤ Vpi. (34)
Finally we can deduce the following inequality from (28) and (34)(
Gpi −Gpi2|a1=i
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 r ≥ 0,∀i ∈ A1.
Symmetrically, we also have(
Gpi −Gpi1|a2=j
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 r ≤ 0,∀j ∈ A2.
As a consequence, we can develop a new version of the optimization formulation by
replacing the linear constraints in (24) with (25), as follows:
minimize:
1
2
(r − µr)
T Σ−1r (r − µr)
subject to:
(
Gpi −Gpi2|a1=i
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 r ≥ 0(
Gpi −Gpi1|a2=j
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 r ≤ 0
for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2.
4. Numerical Example
In this section, we demonstrate the Bayesian MIRL method developed in the previous
sections on a two-player stochastic game modeled on soccer. Though styled after soccer
abstractions in (Littman, 1994; Beling et al., 2013), the game considered here is richer in
that it models an action shoot, which is a direct attempt to score through a ball kick.
4.1 Game and Model
The game is played on a 4 × 5 grid as depicted in Figure 1. We use A and B to denote
two players, and the circle in the figures to represent the ball. Each player can either stay
unmoved or move to one of its neighborhood squares by taking one of 5 actions in each turn:
N (north), S (south), E (east), W (west), and stand. If both players land on the same
square in the same time period, the ball is exchanged between the two players. In addition,
the player who has the ball can shoot, which is to kick the ball toward their opponent’s goal,
with a probability of successful shot (PSS) distribution shown in Table 1. Note that the
action shoot can be taken from any field position, and the PSS is independent of opponent
position. Both players act simultaneously in each time period. Players attempt to dribble
or shoot the ball into specific squares representing their opponent’s goal. Player A attempts
to score by reaching with the ball or shooting the ball into squares 6 or 11, and player B
attempts to score by reaching with the ball or shooting the ball into squares 10 or 15. Once
a point is scored or a shooting is missed, the players take the positions shown in Figure
1 and ball possession is assigned randomly. There are in total 800 states in this model,
corresponding to the positions of the players and ball possession. Each players aims to
maximize expected goals scored, subject to discount factor of γ = 0.9.
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As a third-party observer, we have very limited knowledge about the game they play.
For example, we know this is a zero-sum game and they are try to score points somewhere
in the field. Assume that we watch their playing sufficiently long so that we can statistically
calculate their complete policies and their ball exchange rates. We will infer which squares
each player must reach in order to score a point (the goal squares), as well as the PSS of
each player, by means of recovering their reward vector.
Figure 1: Soccer game: initial board
PSS = 0.7 PSS = 0.5 PSS = 0.3 PSS = 0.1 PSS = 0
A 1, 7, 12, 16 2, 8, 13, 17 3, 9, 14, 18 4, 10, 15, 19 5, 20
PSS = 0.6 PSS = 0.4 PSS = 0.2 PSS = 0.05 PSS = 0
B 5, 9, 14, 20 4, 8, 13, 19 3, 7, 12, 18 2, 6, 11, 17 1, 16
Table 1: Original PSS distribution of each player
For the soccer example, it is worth considering whether IRL could be used to learn
rewards, and whether MIRL would offer any advantages in this regard. Figure 2 helps
to answer these questions. A’s policy is not only decided by her own rewards, but also
dependent on B’s responses to her policy, which is, essentially, controlled by B’s own rewards.
And so is B’s policy. In brief, each player’s policy, is decided by its own rewards and those
of its opponent. With conventional IRL the actions of the opponent could be modeled as
part of the state transition probabilities, but would therefore need to be fixed with respect
a given policy.
4.2 Specification of Prior Information
Recall that the MIRL optimization program requires the specification of two Gaussian prior
parameters for A, the mean of the rewards vector µr and the covariance matrix Σr. Below
we define a concept of strength for prior information that can be expressed independently in
the mean and covariance matrix. Later subsections focus on the impact of different priors
on the quality of learned rewards.
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Figure 2: Soccer game internal relationship
4.2.1 Mean of the Prior
We will use three types of mean reward vectors, namely weak mean, median mean and
strong mean, respectively. Note that since this is a zero-sum game, the rewards assigned to
B are the negatives of these rewards assigned to A.
• Weak Mean: we assign 0.8 point to player A in every state where A has possession of
the ball and −0.8 point in every state where player B has possession of the ball;
• Median Mean: guessing that A’s goal might be among the rightmost squares, or
squares 5, 10, 15 and 20, and symmetrically, B’s goal might be among the leftmost
squares, or squares 1, 6, 11 and 16, we assign 1 point to A whenever A has the ball
and is in the four leftmost squares, and −1 point to A whenever B has the ball and
is in four rightmost squares. Also, when A has the ball and takes a shot, no matter
where she is, we assign 0.5 point to A. Similarly, we assign −0.5 point to A when B
has the ball and takes a shot. Otherwise, no points will be assigned to A.
• Strong Mean: we have a foresight to predict where the goals are for both players, but
cannot make a good guess of their PSS distributions. So comparing to median mean,
the only difference is that now the potential goal area includes only 2 squares (square
6 and 11 for A and square 10 and 15 for B), rather than 4 squares, for both players.
4.2.2 Covariance Matrix
The covariance matrix of the reward vector encodes our belief of the structure of the prior.
Based off of our knowledge of this soccer game, we can develop two types of covariance
matrices.
• Weak Covariance Matrix : an identity matrix, indicating that the reward vector is
assumed independently distributed. This is a universal covariance matrix suitable
for those MIRL problems in which we neither have knowledge of the structure of
unknowns, nor want to make a guess.
• Strong Covariance Matrix : a more complex matrix encapsulating some internal infor-
mation subject to our following beliefs.
1. When A has the ball and takes a shot, the PSS depends only on A’ s position in
the field; likewise for B.
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2. In any state, the reward for A for any non-shoot action is a state-dependent
constant; likewise for B.
There are three types of relationships between any pair of rewards, perfect positive
correlation, perfect negative correlation and mutual independence. In addition, we assume
that the standard deviation of each random variable in the reward vector is the same. This
assumption leads to a conclusion that normalized by a constant, the covariance matrix is
equivalent to the correlation matrix of the unknown vector. Each entry in the correlation
matrix is 0, 1 or -1, in accordance with the relationships embodied in the definitions of weak
and strong covariance. Given the symmetry of the soccer problem, the covariance matrix Σ
will be singular. This presents a problem because the MIRL optimization procedure requires
Σ−1 as input. We address this issue by working with the nonsingular matrix Σˆ = αI + Σ,
where α is a small positive scalar.
4.3 Results Evaluation Metric
To evaluate a recovered result, we simply compute its Average Reward Distance (ARD),
which is the average Euclidean distance from the true rewards as follows.
ARD =
{
1
2NM2
[(
r1rec − r
1
)T (
r1rec − r
1
)
+
(
r2rec − r
2
)T (
r2rec − r
2
)]}1/2
, (35)
where the NM2× 1 column vector rkrec and r
k denote the recovered and original reward of
player k. Obviously, the smaller the ARD is, the more accurate the result is.
If only the players’ PSS distributions are of interest, a similar version of the evaluation
metric, termed Average PSS Distance (APD) can be defined as
APD =
{
1
40
[
20∑
i=1
(
θ1rec (i)− θ
1
0 (i)
)2
+
(
θ2rec (i)− θ
2
0 (i)
)2]}1/2
, (36)
where the 20×1 column vector θkrec and θ
k
0 denote the recovered and original PSS of player
k, respectively.
4.4 Results
Experiments were performed on 6 different priors formed by combining 3 different means
and 2 different covariance matrices. An α = 10−4 was used in the construction of the strong
covariance matrices. In all cases, the bipolicy followed by the players (the observed input
to MIRL) was computed iteratively from Shapley’s Theorem, discussed in Section 2.1.
Results are shown in Figures 3-8. In each figure, the left subfigure shows the inferred
rewards in blue and the benchmark rewards in red. The right subfigure shows the original
PSS as a red stem and the inferred PSS as a blue stem. Table 2 sorts each experiment with
a case number, maps each case to a figure and computes the corresponding APD.
In Case 4, we are also interested in whether the MIRL algorithm can recover the actual
goals for A and B. We calculate the average reward A receives when A is in square 1, 6, 11
and 16 and the average reward B receives when B is in square 5, 10, 15 and 20. The result
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Weak Covariance Strong Covariance
Weak Mean Case 1, Figure 3, 0.4535 Case 2, Figure 4, 0.0671
Median Mean Case 3, Figure 5, 0.2169 Case 4, Figure 6, 0.0387
Strong Mean Case 5, Figure 7, 0.2058 Case 6, Figure 8, 0.0259
Table 2: Basic results summary (α = 0.0001)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x 104
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Reward index
R
ew
ar
d 
va
lu
e
(a) Inferred Rewards
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Position
PS
S 
of
 A
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Position
PS
S 
of
 B
(b) Inferred PSS
Figure 3: Inferred rewards and PSS: weak mean & weak covariance
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Figure 4: Inferred rewards and PSS: weak mean & strong covariance
is shown in Figure 9. The original rewards are shown as red stems and the inferred rewards
blue ones.
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Figure 5: Inferred rewards and PSS: median mean & weak covariance
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Figure 6: Inferred rewards and PSS: median mean & strong covariance
It is also interesting to consider how the ball exchange rate β affects the PSS recovery
result. We repeat Case 6 by changing β from 0 to 1, and calculate the APD of the inferred
PSS distributions. The result is shown in Figure 10.
4.5 Analysis of Results
From Figures 3-8 and Table 2, we can come to the following conclusions:
• The closer the mean is to the actual rewards, the better the quality of learned rewards
will be, and likewise for the covariance matrix.
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Figure 7: Inferred rewards and PSS: strong mean & weak covariance
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Figure 8: Inferred rewards and PSS: strong mean & strong covariance
• The covariance matrix has a greater influence on the quality of learned than does the
mean.
From Figure 9 we can see that our MIRL algorithm successfully learns the goals for A
and B.
Finally, Figure 10 shows that the smaller the β is, the less accurate the recovered PSS
will be. The rationale behind it is that players are inclined to dribble the ball rather than
shoot it toward their opponents’ goal when β is smaller, and consequently, observing the
strategy of dribbling will not generate constraints that substantially alter the mode of the
priors on rewards associated with shooting. For example, when β = 0.2, the probability of
successfully dribbling the ball to the destination for each player is, at worst, (1−β)4 = 0.407,
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Figure 9: Actual goal recovery in case #
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which means that a shot will never be taken in positions where the agent’s PSS is 0.3 or
0.1.
5. Monte Carlo Simulation using Recovered Rewards
In the previous section distance metrics in reward and PSS space are used to evaluate
the quality of learned rewards. In this section we measure reward quality in terms of the
quality of the forward solution that would be based on the rewards. IRL is often set in the
context of apprenticeship learning, in which learned rewards form the basis for anticipating
or mimicking the response of agents to unknown situations. In MIRL, the analogous notion
is to use learned rewards as the basis for game play in different environmental settings.
Consider the soccer example. We discussed and presented results of a typical case where
β, the ball exchange rate, equals 0.6. Suppose this game between A and B is observed by
a third agent C, who wants to play with B in other situations, such as β = 0.4. Obviously,
B’s policy in the new situation will change. But as long as C has learned A’s rewards (and
hence B’s rewards as well because of the zero-sum property), she could develop a minimax
policy, which is optimal for her, to play against B.
In this section, we will simulate games between B and C, where the ball exchange rate
varies. Being rational, B will employ a minimax policy, based off of the true rewards. C
will also follow a minimax policy, based off of her learned rewards. Recall that we have
recovered 6 sets of rewards by assuming 6 different priors, in the previous section, we will
compare the win-lose results of cases where different sets of rewards are employed.
The simulation results are presented in Table 3. In this table, the first column is the
rewards that C employs to develop her minimax policy, where true means the true rewards
and random denotes the rewards based on which result in a random policy, that is, all
possible actions are taken in equal probability in every state. WM, MM, SM, WC and
SC stand for weak mean, median mean, strong mean, weak covariance matrix and strong
covariance matrix, respectively. The rest columns are the simulation results of 10000 rounds
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of games between B and C in cases where β being 0.4, 1 and 0. For a more clear comparison,
we only count those game episodes ending in win-lose outcomes. In each column, the first
and second number are C’s win and loss percentages, respectively.
Base Rewards C vs B (β = 0.4) C vs B (β = 1) C vs B (β = 0)
True 49.95% vs 50.05% 50.08% vs 49.92% 49.43% vs 50.57%
Random 22.78% vs 77.22% 19.22% vs 80.78% 22.91% vs 77.09%
WM & WC 0.00% vs 100.00% 0.00% vs 100.00% 0.00% vs 100.00%
WM & SC 49.58% vs 50.42% 49.78% vs 50.22% 50.66% vs 49.43%
MM & WC 37.62% vs 62.38% 38.95% vs 61.05% 36.29% vs 63.71%
MM & SC 49.70% vs 50.30% 49.63% vs 50.37% 49.84% vs 50.16%
SM & WC 37.63% vs 62.37% 37.32% vs 62.68% 49.31% vs 50.69%
SM & SC 49.16% vs 50.84% 49.75% vs 50.25% 49.84% vs 50.06%
Table 3: C vs B games simulation results
Let us coin the term Application Metric (AM) to refer to C’s probability of winning
in the soccer example. We can draw two conclusions from Table 3. First, B outperforms
or ties C in general. That conclusion is reasonable because B knows the true rewards
so that his policy is truly optimal. The second conclusion comes from Figure 11, which
compares AM with the previous numerical metric ARD. As expected, a larger ARD results
in a smaller probability of winning. What is notable is the sudden crash in probability of
winning experienced when ARD becomes sufficiently large. Equivalently, the probability
of win drops sharply when both the mean and covariance are weak. The implication is
that inferring the structure of the unknowns, is much more crucial than inferring their true
values.
Figure 11: Two metrics comparison
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6. Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we introduced the MIRL problem in the setting of zero-sum stochastic games
and presented a solution based on Bayesian inference. Although it seems that MIRL is a
natural extension of IRL, the MIRL problem presents new challenges. The soccer example
in this paper demonstrates the difficulties we may encounter in a two-person zero-sum MIRL
problem in the real world. Because of the ill-specified nature of the MIRL problem, it may
be difficult to obtain good inverse learning results without knowing anything other than
observations of policies. Fortunately in many real problems, additional information that
can help structure the prior may be available.
Even in simple static games, two important distinctions between inverse learning for
optimization and inverse learning for games emerge. While the model taken in this paper
assumes that the complete bipolicy of two players is observed, it is more likely that only
actions of the individual players are observed. In an optimization setting, since deterministic
policies are assumed, strategies can be inferred exactly from finitely many observations of
actions. In the case of games, strategies are often mixed, and so strategies cannot be inferred
exactly from finitely many observations of the actions taken in each state. Therefore, we
cannot model a player’s strategy as an observation as can be done in IRL. In the setting
of games, strategies must be treated as latent variables that are not observed directly, but
bridge the gap between reward functions and observable actions.
Another direction in the future is likely to be the discovery of appropriate generative
models for more general problems, including perhaps the two-person general-sum game.
General-sum games engeneder unique challenges that complicate the development of like-
lihood functions. The primary challenges associated with games result from the non-
uniqueness of equilibria and the possibly stochastic nature of equilibrium strategies. In
general games, multiple equilibria may be associated with different game values for the two
players. Specifying a likelihood function requires assuming an equilibrium selection mech-
anism for the two players. For example, we might assume that players choose a strategy
uniformly at random from among all available equilibria associated with the reward func-
tions. As another alternative, we might assume that players are driven toward equilibria
that generate a greater value for that player. The specific assumptions imposed on equi-
librium selection will affect the nature of the reward functions recovered from an inverse
learning procedure.
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